A Profile of Al-Hijra
Al-Hijra is a covert group of primarily Kenyan Somali and non-Somali Muslim followers of al-Shabab in East Africa. It is reportedly led by Shaykh Ahmad Iman Ali, who left Kenya to join al-Shabab in Somalia in 2009. Al-Hijra’s geographic center of support is on the Muslim Swahili coast of Kenya and Tanzania, although its base is in the Majengo area of Nairobi.
Al-Hijra’s predecessor, the MYC, was formed at the Pumwani Riyadha Mosque, one of the oldest Islamic institutions in Nairobi, as a community-based organization in 2008. The MYC’s primary objective was to offer counseling, as well as to work for positive social and economic change for the Muslim youth in the Majengo slums who felt discriminated against as Muslim minorities in Kenya. The MYC was funded by the Pumwani Riyadha Mosque Committee (PRMC) through money generated from, among other sources, large sections of land in the Majengo slums and by rent payments from second-hand clothing stalls in the nearby Gikomba market—land which the PRMC owns. The PRMC is also said to control large storage facilities where traders keep their goods and pay rents. The slum and the Gikomba market border Eastleigh, a district in Nairobi that residents call “Little Mogadishu” because of its large population of Kenyan Somalis and refugees who have fled the war in Somalia.
The MYC, however, reportedly developed links to al-Shabab, and was accused of recruiting Kenyan youth to fight for the terrorist group in Somalia. The MYC thrived by generating funds, as well as recruiting and training networks for al-Shabab in Kenyan towns such as Nairobi, Garissa, Mombasa and Eldoret. Some of the recruits had their travel facilitated to Somalia, where they would fight for al-Shabab.
The MYC’s founder, Shaykh Ahmad Iman Ali, was reportedly born in 1973 or 1974 in Kenya. He studied engineering in Nairobi, where he graduated in 1997 or 1998 (although other reports claim he graduated in 2001). After graduation, he worked for Shell and Exxon Mobil oil companies as an engineer. As a youth leader at the Pumwani Riyadha Mosque, Iman Ali oversaw the construction of a new mosque building. In 2007, he masterminded the ouster of the executive committee of the Pumwani Riyadha Mosque, leading to the removal of five officials over alleged corruption and mismanagement. Al-Shabab’s leadership allegedly took note of his fundamentalism and secretly appointed him as the de facto leader of its cell in Nairobi. In 2009, reports emerged that the MYC was recruiting youth for al-Shabab from within the mosque. Iman Ali left for Somalia in 2009, where he became leader of the al-Shabab cell in Kenya. His role was to plan terrorist operations with militants in Kenya. Members of the mosque then suspected that the committee had previously channeled funds to al-Shabab when under Iman Ali’s leadership.
Iman Ali’s MYC, however, had long aspired to carry out attacks in Kenya. That aspiration gained momentum in October 2011, when Kenyan troops entered Somalia to pursue al-Shabab militants. On January 10, 2012, nearly three months after Kenyan troops deployed to Somalia, al-Shabab announced a merger with the Kenya-based MYC. It also designated the MYC’s Iman Ali as al-Shabab’s representative for Kenyan affairs. In a statement, the MYC welcomed the development, stating there was no doubt that Iman Ali’s elevation as the supreme amir of Kenya was recognition from the “Somali brothers who fought tirelessly against the kuffar on the importance of the Kenya mujahidin in Somalia.”
The following month, in February 2012, the MYC renamed itself al-Hijra, with Iman Ali as its leader. The proposal to change the name was floated at a secret strategy meeting between the MYC and PRMC in Majengo in Nairobi. According to the United Nations, the MYC chose to change their name to avoid the scrutiny of the authorities, which had taken action against MYC-affiliated names and bank accounts.
The MYC’s official name change was not immediately noticeable on their social media outlets. Twitter and Tumblr accounts linked to the MYC continued to release statements under its old names. The “MYC Press” Twitter account still continues to operate, posting discussions on jihad and other matters affecting Muslims. There was much activity on the Tumblr account from January to September 2013, but the last press release was issued in September 2013.
A letter from the members of the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea said in 2012 that al-Hijra continued to operate in Kenya with relative freedom, sending funds and recruits to Somalia in support of al-Shabab, while simultaneously developing plans to conduct terrorist attacks inside Kenya, deploying several operational cells for this purpose.
Corrupt judge, rogue lawyer, blood money aid terrorists to slaughter Kenyans
April 04, 2022
Nation Media Group
That the most trusted officers of the court can betray their country to terrorists is a classical demonstration of the enemy within.
In December 2011, Somalia-based Al-Shabaab terrorists were planning attacks against specific targets in Kenya, including the United Nations offices in Nairobi, Parliament and security installations. They were supposed to be retaliatory attacks.
Two months earlier, on October 16, President Mwai Kibaki had ordered the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) to cross the border into Somalia in pursuit of militants who had carried out numerous cross-border raids. KDF soldiers are still in Somalia.
The plot against Kenya wasn’t an idle threat. Nairobi had been rocked by two separate grenade attacks on October 24, 2011.
The twin blasts, which came less than 24 hours of each other, weren’t initially considered terror attacks. After all, there had been no claim of responsibility.
The last time the country had witnessed a terrorist attack was on August 7, 1998. Then, nearly simultaneous bombs blew up in front of the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Some 224 people were killed in the explosions and more than 4,500 wounded.
Since that time, all had been calm, until the grenade attacks on October 24, 2011. A day after the grenade attacks, Kenyan police announced they had arrested Elgiva Bwire Oliacha, alias Mohammed Seif.
Security officers also seized 12 grenades, an AK-47 assault rifle, four revolvers and a submachine gun. It was not until October 28, 2011, following Bwire’s confession, that security agencies would realise they were dealing with a terrorist attack.
Bwire stated he was a member of Al-Shabaab and was sentenced to life in prison after one of the fastest terrorism trials. But Bwire would later exploit a botched investigation to successfully appeal against the life sentence, which was reduced to 10 years. He was freed from Kamiti Maximum Security Prison on October 28 last year.
But he was abducted along with his cousin on their way to Eastleigh. They haven’t been seen since.
Amid accusations he had been seized by security agents, the Directorate of Criminal Investigations (DCI) placed a bounty of Sh10 million for Bwire’s capture, accusing him of plotting reprisal attacks.
Planned suicide attack
But classified documents Kenya submitted to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) last year to support its case in the maritime dispute with Somalia state that Bwire’s “real intention in October 2011 was much more disturbing than attacking ‘soft targets’ in Kenya”.
The Monitoring Group’s reports submitted to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) say the group had received information that Bwire had returned to Kenya to carry out a suicide attack.
It cited testimony from current and former Somalia-based Al Hijra fighters, a statement from a captured Al Hijra fighter returning from Somalia to Kenya, and an audio recording of a key Al Hijra facilitator of material support and resources.
Before his arrest, on October 7, 2011, an Al Hijra fighter based in lower Juba was researching on the internet tourist attractions in East Africa and US interests in Kenya. The terror suspect also sought information on sodium, hydrogen and isotopes.
“It is the assessment of the Monitoring Group that the above attempts by this particular fighter are consistent with several of Al Hijra’s aspirational plots,” reads the report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution in 2013.
“These include a reportedly abortive suicide plot, a plot to attack the Parliament of Kenya, and unconfirmed reports of a plot against former President Mwai Kibaki and Prime Minister Raila Odinga of Kenya,” according to extracts from the report, which was filed with the UNSC in October 2014.
Bwire’s association with Al Hijra dated back to 2009, when he reportedly attended a lecture titled “Role of the Youth in Da’wah”, delivered to Al Hijra (Muslim Youth Centre at the time) by Sheikh Ali Bahero on October 10.
On October 20, 2011, five days before his arrest, Bwire attended Mashujaa Day celebrations at Nyayo Stadium in Nairobi, along with possibly between three and five other Al-Hijra members.
Audio recordings about the event suggest what may have been Bwire’s real intention. The recordings detail a January 19, 2013 meeting of Al Hijra fighters at the Hotel La Kairo in Mwanza, Tanzania.
In attendance at the meeting called to discuss the relocation of an Al Hijra cell from Kenya to a safe house in Tanzania was senior Al Hijra member Ibrahim Ramadan Hamisi, alias Ruta.
Ruta had previously fought alongside Al-Shabaab in Somalia but had returned to Kenya in 2010.
Ruta recalled his last meeting with Bwire.
“He [Bwire] was in a Gor Mahia [Kenyan football club] jersey… He and the other brothers decided that they would wait further instructions from Abu Zubeyr. You know, before that, he [Bwire] had undertaken some tasks here and there. The other brothers thought that he was now ready for Shahada because of the way he had handled the tasks.”
Ruta then described how he had parted with Bwire probably hours before his arrest.
“We [‘Ruta’ and Bwire] met and left each other around midnight. I left him looking for a place to spend the night. The following day we hired a taxi and escorted him to Coast Bus stage.
“As usual, he was carrying a rucksack, which contained the cargo. Some of the brothers were of the idea that the cargo be opened and others were refusing. The issue generated a lot of disagreement among the brothers.
“He was to travel to Coast. Upon our arrival he alighted and we left. He was arrested around 5am because we left one another around midnight.”
The recordings are archived with the UN. The Monitoring Group believes that Ruta was one of a few individuals who would have known Bwire’s main operational intent.
Rashid, a former Al-Shabaab fighter, alluded to Bwire’s possible suicide attack attempt by praising him that “the last time Bwire outsmarted them [Kenyan security services] even though it looked like the security was tight during the Mushujaa Day”.
The conversations are in the audio recording of Rashid at the Hotel La Kairo in Mwanza, Tanzania, on January 20, 2013.
But the jailing of Bwire was no deterrence, more trouble awaited Kenya. And Ruta would be in the heart of the plots.
Enter Thabit Jamaldin Yahya, alias Bobby, and his associate Jermaine John Grant. Thabit had been recruited from Kibera in Nairobi to become an Al Hijra Somalia-based fighter.
Thabit had claimed he was inspired into jihad by watching and listening to the lectures of the UK extremist Omar Trevor Brooks, alias Abu Izzadeen, the spokesman of the UK-banned Al Ghurabaa.
Bomb-making materials
On the other hand, Grant, known in terrorism circles as the ‘bomb instructor’, was a UK national who identified himself more with the Al-Qaida cause than Al-Shabaab.
The Monitoring Group believes Thabit and a group of possibly five other Somalia-based Al Hijra fighters left Kismayo in December 2011. On December 20, 2011, Grant was arrested in Mombasa with his close associate Fuad Abubakar Manswab, alias Fuad.
Both Grant and Fuad were charged with being in possession of bomb-making materials, including electric switches, small batteries and bottles of chemicals (hydrogen peroxide and ammonium nitrate).
The Monitoring Group learnt that during Grant’s interrogation by the Kenyan security services on December 25, 2011, he admitted to having been in Somalia and claimed he was a member of Al-Qaida and not Al-Shabaab.
Citing information from law enforcement sources, corroborated by the testimony of Al Hijra fighters, the Monitoring Group reported that Grant and others were probably in the advanced stages of an attack in December 2011.
“During his interrogation he alluded to the fact that Al-Shabaab was at the time planning attacks in Kenya against specific targets, including the United Nations Office in Nairobi, the Kenyan Parliament and other security installations,” the report states.
Meanwhile, upon arrival in Kenya, Thabit was hosted by Ruta in Majengo, Nairobi.
“When I came back [from Somalia] I went to that brother [Ruta] in Majengo. He is the only one who knew I was around [from Somalia] and he never let me down,” Thabit would later tell an associate, whom he was persuading to consider working with Ruta on Al-Shabaab plots.
It wouldn’t be long before Thabit made his presence felt.
Thabit was among the terrorists who staged the March 2012 grenade attack at the Machakos Country Bus terminus in which seven people were killed and at least 69 others injured.
Four grenades were thrown from a passing car, then internal security minister George Saitoti said of the March 10, 2012 terrorist attack that officials described as the deadliest in Nairobi since the 1998 US embassy bombings.
“This is an attack by people who think they can puncture the resolve of Kenyan people to fight against terror,” then vice-president Kalonzo told reporters outside Kenyatta National Hospital, where the injured were being treated.
The Monitoring Group gleaned the confession about Thabit’s involvement from a January 18, 2013 telephone conversation between Ruta and a key Al Hijra female courier, “R”.
Ruta had met “R” from 11am to 7pm at the Hotel La Kairo in Mwanza, Tanzania, to discuss the logistics of moving the Al Hijra cell to a more secure safe house in the coastal town of Tanga.
According to “R”’s account of her discussion with Ruta, the latter described his secret role in supporting Al-Shabaab in Kenya since his departure from Somalia.
Ruta cited the Machakos Country Bus terminus attack, which he claimed was carried out by himself, Thabit and others.
In Ruta’s attempt to convince “R” of his involvement in the bus stage attack, he described how Thabit had accidently dropped his passport at the scene of the attack and was unsure if the security services were aware of this vital clue.
Thabit was arrested on May 15, 2012 for his involvement in the Bella Vista grenade attack in Mombasa in which he and two others killed a security guard. But even in prison, Thabit continued with his terror campaign.
One of the instances was when the security services eavesdropped on his attempt, while still at Shimo la Tewa prison in Mombasa, to recruit a fighter to work with Ruta.
That was during a regular ‘secure phone’ contact at 21:24pm on December 24, 2012 with the confidential source on the issue of procuring explosives
But one man was, however, desperate to secure the release of Thabit to advance his evil plot against Kenya.
Al Hijra fighters
Abubakar Shariff Ahmed, alias Makaburi, was keen to enhance operations in Mombasa and possibly regionally in Tanzania.
Makaburi, a radical Muslim cleric, had been listed by the UN as a recruiter for the al-Qaeda-linked al-Shabab group. He would be shot dead outside the coastal city of Mombasa on April 1 2014.
“The Monitoring Group understands that the significance of securing Thabit’s release was based on Makaburi’s belief that if Thabit were released from prison, he would be able, albeit consigned to using crutches, to motivate, incite and provide operational guidance to other Al Hijra fighters that had been dispatched from Somalia,” the report states.
Central to this plan was a lawyer (name withheld for legal reasons). A confidential Al Hijra source told the Monitoring Group the lawyer had in the past secured the release of Somalia-based Al Hijra fighters and other members “by fundraising to bribe members of the Kenyan judiciary”.
“As explained to the Monitoring Group, bribes are normally offered to members of the judiciary to reduce and grant bail for detained suspected Al Hijra/Al-Shabaab members,” the report states.
The report cites a confidential audio recording of the lawyer dated February 16, 2013, which is archived with the United Nations, in which the lawyer refers to Thabit “as a good leader that had shown proficiency in gathering intelligence”.
“And in spite of being in Shimo la Tewa prison, (he) had managed to oversee the procurement and transfer of weapons,” the lawyer is quoted saying.
According to the report, on February 2, 2013, the Monitoring Group was briefed on a plan that, if accurate, suggested that a Kenyan High Court judge (name withheld) had agreed to grant Thabit a reduced bail on the condition of a bribe from the lawyer acting on behalf of Al-Hijra and Makaburi.
The Monitoring Group cites information received from a close associate of the lawyer that suggests his relationship with the judge dates back several years.
According to the report, Al Hijra was to raise $1,800 (Sh150,000 at the time). On February 16, 2013, the lawyer returned to meet a female Al Hijra member after learning that Al Hijra had secured $480 (Sh40,000).
“If the cash could be raised to hundred thousand though I believe the fifty thousand on top of that could be their cut and the remaining for their boss [judge]. If motor vehicle logbooks could be found with the value of five hundred thousand each would be better,” the report reads.
“I believe the bond could be brought down to one million and always these Judges will never [accept] one surety. He will have to give two sureties just to be sure that he [Thabit] will attend court.
“But if Babu [Ruta] can meet with Buda [Makaburi] and explain about the possibility of the bond reduction things could be easier because Buda [Makaburi] might be able to convince the Mombasa Muslims and the possibility of the amount to be raised.
“Even the other case concerning Fuad the money has been changing hands and the Judge has softened his stand.”
During the same meeting, the lawyer claimed he would soon provide his own contribution towards the judge’s funds.
“Four days later, (the lawyer) at 3:57pm on 20 February 2013, received an M-Pesa mobile money transfer via Safaricom for 480 USD (40,000 Kenyan Shillings) towards (the judge’s) bribe. By 1 March 2013, Thabit’s funds for facilitating his release were complete when a Mombasa-based Al Hijra member, Kassim Kassim Jembe, gave 1200 USD (100,000 Kenyan Shillings) to a female Al Hijra courier who was instructed to call the lawyer to confirm the funds were available for collection,” states the report, citing an interview with the Al Hijra courier on March 5, 2013.
On March 3, 2013, the lawyer alluded to others working possibly in the judge’s office being involved in the conspiracy to release Thabit.
“You know with the court matters we have to take our chance but so far there’s been no incident that has risen where money has disappeared and the work wasn’t done. Even when I hand it over personally, I remind them how I have people who don’t understand,” the report quotes the lawyer saying.
“You don’t know them, however, they will deal with me. The only time these issues got me into trouble is when some guy promised to get me the people who normally accept 10 percent. We paid money which mind you is non-refundable then the guy disappeared. I was under so much pressure.
“But these things come and pass. The Court is like that. After that case, we had someone inside that place [Court]. I had to call him again to see if they are still psyched up and still in the deal.”
The Monitoring Group concludes that at the time of writing the report, Thabit was still in prison.
“However, on 21 April 2013, the Monitoring Group received information following a meeting between an Al Hijra member and (the lawyer) that strongly suggests that (the judge) may have received a sum of 1800 USD as a bribe to reduce the bail bond for Thabit,” the report states.
How Tanzanian security services saved Kenya from elections day terror attack
April 05, 2022
Nation Media group
A sinister plot against Kenya and a plan to assassinate a law enforcement officer were underway at Shimo la Tewa prison in Mombasa. Thabit Jamaldin Yahya, alias Bobby, and his associate Jermaine John Grant, who had been imprisoned for terrorist attacks in the country were plotting their revenge.
The two separate but interlinked plots to assassinate an Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU) investigating officer and destabilise the March 2013 General Election were initiated in 2012.
Abubakar Shariff Ahmed, alias Makaburi, a radical Muslim cleric, was directing the planning of the attacks from the outside. The UN had listed Makaburi as a recruiter for the Al-Qaeda-linked Al-Shabaab group.
Also monitoring the development from Somalia was Ahmad Iman, the Al Hijra ‘Amir’ and Al-Shabaab’s official representative for Kenya. Iman, a preacher in Nairobi who had fled to Somalia in 2009, had formed Al Hijra out of the Muslim Youth Centre (MYC).
MYC had recruited its followers from Majengo, Nairobi, and the port city of Mombasa. In Coast, Al Hijra was led by Sheikh Aboud Rogo Mohammed. Rogo, its ideological leader, was inexplicably killed in Mombasa on August 27, 2012, a month after the UN Security Council Committee designated him for targeted measures.
The ATPU investigating officer was to be killed for a number of Al-Shabaab-related trials in Mombasa, including the case of Thabit. On October 16, 2012, Thabit and Grant, while in remand at Shimo la Tewa prison, telephoned a female Al Hijra member in Nairobi.
Female members
The initial discussion centred on ‘jihad’ and the possibility of female members travelling to Somalia, according to classified security documents Kenya submitted to the International Court of Justice last year during the hearing of a maritime boundary dispute with Somalia. But a series of subsequent visits to Shimo la Tewa prison became the basis for the initial planning stages of the plot to assassinate the ATPU officer, known to the Monitoring Group as officer “X”.
“Since November 2012, the Monitoring Group was regularly briefed, indirectly by Al Hijra members in prison in Mombasa and serving Al Hijra members based in Nairobi, on two separate but interlinked plots that were largely directed by Makaburi and monitored from Somalia by Ahmad Iman,” reads the report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution in 2013. Apart from the assassination plot, there was also “a plan to procure explosives in Tanzania for transportation to Kenya for an attack initially scheduled around the time of the Kenyan elections”, according to extracts from the report, which was filed with the UNSC in October 2014.
“The above plots mark a higher level of planning and coordination between Al-Shabaab in Somalia and its regional affiliates both in Kenya and Tanzania in planning to carry out violent attacks and may signify a new alarming trend,” the report cautioned.
Al Hijra female courier
A week later on November 21, 2012, a key Al Hijra female courier, “R”, and a Kenyan lawyer met with Thabit. The Monitoring Group obtained the original “instruction notes” of this meeting. Thabit and the lawyer informed “R” that Makaburi had requested the assistance of Al Hijra in procuring three ‘kids’ (firearms).
The firearms would be used in an operation that would later be explained to “R” and other Al Hijra members. In order to begin communicating “securely” with Thabit and others in Shimo la Tewa prison, as well as with Makaburi’s interlocutors, “R” was given a set of codes.
On returning to Nairobi on November 22, 2012, “R” received a coded message from Thabit on behalf of Makaburi. The translation was: That ATPU [officer] should be finished [killed]. According to “R”, days later, Thabit called from Shimo la Tewa prison requesting her to contact a close associate named “Jah Rule”, who would facilitate the acquisition of three ‘kids’ (firearms) to be used in Makaburi’s operation to assassinate officer “X”.
Though a criminal in Nairobi, Jah Rule was not a member of Al-Shabaab or Al Hijra. According to “R” and confirmed by Makaburi, during a subsequent operational meeting in Mombasa, once Jah Rule had helped procure the firearms, they would be transferred to Makaburi in Mombasa either by “R” or another person known to the Monitoring Group as “Jembe”.
Sense of urgency
On December 17, 2012 in Mombasa, Makaburi met with some of his co-conspirators, including “R”, the lawyer and “Jembe”, to offer his thoughts on the plot. During the meeting, Makaburi revealed the plot to assassinate officer “X” was indeed his plan and not Thabit’s as some of them believed.
Makaburi told his guests that officer “X”’s house in Mombasa had been identified and was under surveillance. But he noted the target’s pattern of movements had changed, indicating officer “X” may have been aware of a plot against him.
As the planning progressed into January 2013, a sense of urgency became apparent when Thabit and Makaburi opted to pursue a “plan B” on procuring the three firearms required for the assassination. Jah Rule had become unreachable during this period. However, on January 1, 2013 at 5:59pm, Thabit, from prison, contacted a female Al Hijra member, who had regular access to Iman in Somalia via phone. He informed her that an alternative plan was being pursued with another local criminal known as “Doctor”.
“If it works we will go with the Doctor,” the report quotes Thabit telling the confidential source during a ‘secure phone’ discussion. The audio recording is archived with the United Nations.
It shows that on January 27, 2013, a senior Al Hijra member, Ibrahim Ramadan Hamisi, alias Ruta, had met Makaburi, who had tasked him to return to Nairobi to procure a consignment of AK-47s to be used in another related plot that appears to have had the backing of Al-Shabaab.
By February 6, 2013, Ruta, during a meeting on the logistics of the weapons that would by now have been procured from Garissa, could be heard in an audio recording accessed by the Monitoring Group that despite his current court case he “will continue with his activities [acting on behalf of Al-Shabaab] whether they [government of Kenya] like it or not”.
On February 15, 2013, a female courier received a message from Al Hijra fighters in Tanga confirming they had identified explosives that would then need to be transported back to Makaburi in Kenya.
According to the Monitoring Group, throughout the initial planning stages of the operation to transport explosives into Kenya, there had been no substantive discussions on potential targets or the use of the explosives until February 16, 2013, at least to the knowledge of the Al Hijra female courier cell.
However, the Monitoring Group reported that the Kenyan lawyer appears to have had foreknowledge of potential targets. The lawyer had also been receiving bomb-making instructions from Grant during their meetings to be passed on to Makaburi, the report claims. On February 23, 2013, in a meeting in Mombasa to discuss a related and more daring plot by Makaburi and Al Hijra members to transfer explosives into Kenya, Makaburi met with both “R” and Ruta.
Transporting explosives
Information received by the Monitoring Group from a confidential source present at the meeting described Makaburi’s update on the ATPU plot. Makaburi still intended to continue with the plot and had been looking for someone to execute the plan, but he had also discovered that officer “X” had recently moved to a new a residence.
By February 25, 2013, the female couriers had arrived in Tanga and the following day began cross briefing with the Al Hijra fighters at the safe house on transporting Makaburi’s explosives into Kenya. A three-hour audio recording of a discussion on February 26, 2013, at the safe house indicated Al Hijra fighters “Rashid” and Athman Ahmed alias Mwarabu were confident that the explosives would successfully be transported to Kenya. From December 2012 to March 1, 2013, the Monitoring Group closely monitored the movements of a number of Al Hijra fighters retreating from Kenya to regroup in Tanzania and close to the Ugandan border. One such fighter was “Rashid”, who had assumed the Tanzanian name of Jacob Mtunzi Rwakatale.
If unable to obtain TNT from Tanga, the Al Hijra fighters claimed during the audio recording that Makaburi would have to resort to a consignment hidden in Mombasa.
However, in Kenya on February 25, 2013, at 5:52pm, the lawyer sent a private message via Facebook to a female Al Hijra member in Kiswahili informing the Al Hijra couriers not to attempt transporting the explosives.
On the evening of March 1, 2013, Tanzanian security services raided the Al Hijra safe house and arrested seven individuals, including Rashid and Mwarabu. The Tanzanian security services in cooperation with their Kenyan counterparts had managed to foil the operation only three days to the General Election.
“It is the Monitoring Group’s assessment that this disruption of the explosives plot in addition to Makaburi’s claim of not being able to immediately find someone to execute his assassination plot may have led to Al Hijra and Makaburi aborting the plan to assassinate officer “X”,” reads the document.
“Al Hijra’s brazen attempt to move beyond ‘soft targets’ to actively demonstrating its ability to carry out Al-Shabaab styled assassinations in the region continues to remain a worrying trend by the affiliate,” the report concludes.
Shabaab bomb maker planned to attack Parliament, surveilled Kibaki, Raila
April 06, 2022
Nation Media group
Titus Nabiswa, alias Mwalim Khalid, a recruit from Majengo, was a Kenyan fighter who had risen through the ranks to become a senior figure in al-Shabaab.
Described as an explosives expert and operational planner, the Kenyan ‘Amir’ had dispatched tens of al Hijra fighters from Somalia to carry out attacks in Kenya. Reported to have al-Qaida links as well, Khalid returned to Kenya around the middle of 2012 to plot an attack on a bigger target: Parliament.
Key to the plot was a Parliament worker (name withheld for legal reasons) and a long-time serving official of the Pumwani Riyadha Mosque Committee (PRMC), according to classified documents that Kenya submitted to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) last year to support its case in the maritime dispute with Somalia.
Khalid attempted to persuade the parliamentary worker to assist with the plot, said the Monitoring Group, a body tasked by the UN Security Council to investigate the crisis in Somalia.
“In or about June 2012, according to multiple sources, Khalid dispatched a group of Somalia-based al-Hijra fighters to Kenya as part of al-Shabaab’s operations to destabilise the country,” reveals a report by the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, pursuant to a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution in 2013.
“Mwalim Khalid’s various plans included a plot to attack the Parliament of Kenya, according to a confidential source that had initial knowledge of it.”
Kibaki, Raila targeted
Upon returning from Somalia, Khalid had been hosted in Mombasa by an accomplice known to the Monitoring Group as Rashid, who would later reveal Khalid had been plotting even higher-profile attacks. Rashid claimed he had been instructed by Khalid to carry out surveillance on then-President Mwai Kibaki and Prime Minister Raila Odinga, according to extracts from the report, which was filed with the UNSC in October 2014.
Although the date was unspecified, the Monitoring Group estimated it to be between June 2012 and no later than October 27, 2012.
Under interrogation by the Kenyan security services, al-Qaida-affiliated Jermaine John Grant in December 2011 also claimed al-Shabaab was planning to attack a number of targets in Kenya, including the Parliament.
“Information about the parliament plot was also corroborated during a meeting in Tanga on 23 January 2013 in which Rashid alluded to being aware of it,” reads the report, citing an interview on January 24, 2013, with a source with direct responsibility for logistics for al Hijra in the Tanzanian town.
Rashid had fled from Kenya to Tanzania as security agents caught up with his guest, perhaps because of Khalid’s high-prized targets.
On October 28, 2012, while travelling from Nairobi to Mombasa, “most probably to coordinate further attacks in Mombasa”, says the report, Khalid was intercepted at Mariakani.
“Photographic evidence obtained by the Monitoring Group indicates that Mwalim Khalid was in possession of a small arms cache,” the report says.
“Following his interception, Mwalim Khalid led security services to an associate, Omar Faraj, hiding in Mombasa. This led, according to media reports, to a shootout that resulted in both Mwalim Khalid and Omar Faraj being killed by the security services.”
Information received by the Monitoring Group suggests that after the killing of Mwalim Khalid and his failed Parliament plot, al Hijra was forced to rethink its operations, particularly in Mombasa.
The report also accuses the Parliament employee of advising PRMC “on ways and means of concealing its support to al-Shabaab through al Hijra” following the enactment of the Kenya Prevention of Terrorism Act in October 2012. This information was gleaned from interviews with former al Hijra members and officials of the PRMC between September and December 2012.
“Despite its public and firm denial of funding or assisting recruitment for al-Shabaab, the Pumwani Riyadha Mosque Committee continues to view its support of al-Shabaab through al Hijra as a religious obligation,” the report claims.
Evidence
The Monitoring Group, in the report, said it obtained sufficient information substantiating the threat that Khalid “represented in terms of his intent and capability as a Kenyan al-Shabaab ‘Amir’”.
“This has included information from officials knowledgeable about al-Shabaab’s threat capability in Kenya and the region, and testimonies from al Hijra members, including audio recordings of a current al Hijra fighter’s assessment of Mwalim Khalid.”
The Monitoring Group also noted that while some al Hijra fighters had fled Somalia because of disaffection with al-Shabaab, “Mwalim Khalid’s return was more than likely based on operational necessity and his convictions in extending al-Shabaab’s ‘Jihad’ to Kenya”.
Somalia-based al Hijra fighter Athman Ahmed, alias Mwarabu, expressed the group’s pragmatism succinctly during a discussion at a safe house in Mwanza, Tanzania, on January 19, 2013.
“[We] had planned everything. We were ready even before that. When Titus [Mwalim Khalid] was [killed], it ruined our plans. But we didn’t lose our morale. We started planning afresh,” the Monitoring Group wrote, citing confidential audio recordings of Mwarabu, Ruta and others in Mwanza.
Ruta was an alias for Ibrahim Ramadan Hamisi, another senior al Hijra member.
Almost a month later, in November 2012, Kenyan security services again disrupted a plot involving al Hijra members, including Khubeib Rogo, who had just returned from Somalia, and Swaleh Abdulmajid, who, in 2010, was arrested for attempting to travel to Somalia to join al-Shabaab with UK national Michael Olumide Adebolajo.
“On November 13, 2012, following the disruption of another potential large-scale terrorist attack in Mombasa and elsewhere involving al Hijra members, security services arrested and interrogated Khubeib Aboud Rogo, the son of the late ideological leader of al Hijra. During his interrogation, Khubeib Rogo claimed al-Shabaab had sent at least six suicide bombers to Kenya,” the report says.
“This testimony, albeit obtained under interrogation, is corroborated by another al Hijra fighter returning from Somalia who was arrested on 6 September 2012, and who confirmed that ‘Mohammed Seif’ had been dispatched by al-Shabaab as a suicide bomber.”
Inmates’ accounts
Mohammed Seif was the alias of Elgiva Bwire Oliacha, who was later jailed over grenade attacks in Nairobi. He went missing following his release last year after serving a 10-year jail term. “Information received by the Monitoring Group and corroborated by serving members of al Hijra, including indirect information accessed from al Hijra members in Shimo la Tewa prison in November 2012, strongly suggests that the group had planned simultaneous attacks against multiple targets,” the report states.
According to the report, the Monitoring Group was aware of credible reports circulating within al Hijra circles during November 2012 that suggested Khubeib Rogo had returned from Somalia to avenge his father’s death. The senior Rogo, a radical Islamist cleric, was killed in a drive-by shooting in Mombasa on August 27, 2012.
A month to his assassination, the UN Security Council had imposed a travel ban and asset freeze on Rogo for supporting terror activities.
The Monitoring Group also understands that Khubeib Rogo had alluded to seeking revenge on behalf of his father during his interrogation by the security services.
The Monitoring Group believes these targets may have included a church, a police station in Mombasa and other public facilities.
Thabit Jamaldin Yahya: How Toothbrush clue sealed fate of Mombasa terrorist
Monday, March 28, 2022
Nation Media Group
By all circumstances, Thabit Jamaldin Yahya could have been an innocent passer-by and a victim of a 2012 terrorist attack in Mombasa were it not for his toothbrush and grenade pellets.
These two items, together with other personal effects, implicated the man in the Bella Vista Club terror attack that left a woman dead and several others injured.
The toothbrush was inside a bag that had been left in Pegassus Bus and was recovered in Nairobi.
Inside the bag were also wedding invitations and the bus tickets in his name for the several trips he had made between Nairobi and Mombasa.
There was also another bag that he had left in the custody of his friend that contained a laptop and other personal effects.
Yahya had booked seat number 15 in the Pegassus bus and was to travel to Nairobi at 10:30pm on the night of May 15, 2012.
That night, he neither showed up for the journey nor collected his laptop and the second bag.
Less than an hour before the departure time, Yahya and his friend walked to the club but declined to be frisked by security personnel.
Popular club
They were blocked from entering the once popular club and thus walked away. That time, Yahya wore blue jeans and a black jacket.
Mary Cheptirim (now deceased) was one of the guards at the club while a Mr Boniface and Gregory were among those checking patrons as they entered the club.
Ten minutes later, Yahya and his friend returned to the club and tried to force themselves in but were blocked again.
They then hurled a grenade at the club’s entrance and what followed were three successive blasts, which threw the guards and the attackers to the ground.
At the Coast General Hospital, the guard saw Yahya, the man they had seen hurling the grenade, next to their bed, also writhing in pain as a result of the explosion.
He would then be arrested after several witnesses identified him.
Mr Yahya was then charged with the murder of Ms Cheptirim, who died as a result of the grenade explosion.
At the scene, detectives recovered several items including four grenade levers, two safety pins and fragments of pellets. Also recovered around the scene were a pistol, magazine and ammunition.
Detectives also collected Yahya’s personal effects, including his clothes and swabs from the grenade safety pins for DNA analysis, in the Federal Bureau Investigations (FBI) laboratory in the US.
The toothbrush recovered in Nairobi and blood samples collected from the crime scene formed part of the exhibits that had been flown to the US for DNA matching.
These items would then help the police link Yahya to the attack.
Results of the analysis showed that Yahya’s DNA was found on the toothbrush, firearm, magazine and bullets recovered at the scene of the grenade attack.
Hawking different items
The detectives discovered that Yahya had planned to stage the attack then travel to Nairobi on the same night but things did not work according to his plan.
From the court record, Yahya admitted to being near the club at the time of the blast but explained that he was hawking different items.
He denied any involvement in the grenade detonations, claiming that he was an innocent passer-by when the explosive went off.
“I was hawking wares around the famous Mombasa tusks at about 9pm when I heard a blast. I was going home at the time. I woke up a few days later in hospital,” he defended himself in court.
However, detectives established that he had planned the attack but had become a victim of his own actions.
The High Court in 2016 sentenced him to death after finding that he was directly linked to the attack that led to the death of Ms Cheptirim.
He challenged the decision at the Court of Appeal. On March 10, the appellate court upheld the sentence.
“We find no reason to disturb that sentence. The result of this appeal is that it fails in its entirety and is accordingly dismissed,” said Justices Stephen Kairu, Pauline Nyamweya and Jessie Lesiit.
Revealed – Inside Al-Shabaab Plan to Kill Mwai Kibaki, Raila Odinga
30 MARCH 2021
Al-Shabaab terrorists had in 2012 plotted to harm President Mwai Kibaki and Prime Minister Raila Odinga, Nation has established.
One of the terrorists frequently visited Nyeri to identify the President’s routine between June and October 2012, according to Kenya’s submissions to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in February on the Indian Ocean boundary case with Somalia.
Militia from Al Hijra, a local network of al-Shabaab, also spied on Mr Odinga. The documents detail al-Shabaab terrorist attacks and plots foiled by Kenyan authorities. One of the annexes in support of the application requesting the court to authorise Kenya to file new documentation and evidence is headlined ‘Plots against the State: President, Prime Minister and Parliament.’
“Al-Shabaab aspirations to violently overthrow the Kenya state predate the Kenya Defence Forces official incursion into Somalia in 2011,” reads the report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution in 2013.
Extracts from the report, which was filed with the UNSC in October 2014, cite an audio from Somalia by Al Hijra’s ‘Amir’ Ahmad Iman in December 2010 that exposes the plot against the Kenyan leaders.
Al Hijra/al-Shabaab members
Amir warned the Kenyan government against its covert intervention under “Operation Linda Mpaka,” according to a restricted Directorate of Military Intelligence document detailing KDF’s mission in Somalia obtained by the Monitoring Group in 2011.
In the audio, Amir says “strap the bombs on me and let me blow myself up in the Parliament building of Kenya, let not anyone survive. Even Kibaki… .”
In the report, the Monitoring Group says it had received uncorroborated claims that in 2012, Al Hijra/al-Shabaab members conspiring with ‘Makaburi’ may have instigated plots against Kenya’s former President and Prime Minister. Abubakar Shariff Ahmed alias Makaburi had been cited in previous UNSC reports as vowing allegiance to al-Shabaab and pledging to continue his recruitment drives in Kenya on behalf of the Somali militia.
From December 2012 to March 1, 2013, the group closely monitored the movements of a number of Al Hijra fighters retreating from Kenya to regroup in Tanzania and close to the Ugandan border. One such fighter was Rashid, who had assumed the Tanzanian name of Jacob Mtunzi Rwakatale.
The group cites information received from a credible confidential source that had direct access to Rashid, who was responsible for the welfare and logistics of the militants fleeing Kenya in Tanzania. On January 24, 2013, during a field mission to Tanzania, the group was briefed on a discussion in which Rashid casually referred to his operations.
“According to Rashid’s account, at an unspecified date but probably in the Monitoring Group’s estimate between June 2012 and no later than October 27, 2012, he had been instructed by a senior Al Hijra/al-Shabaab member named Titus Nabiswa ‘Mwalim Khalid’ to travel to Nyeri for the purpose of carrying out “surveillance” on the then President of Kenya, Mwai Kibaki,” the report states.
Operational planner
Citing interviews on January 24, 2013 with sources with direct responsibility for logistics for Al Hijra in Tanga, Tanzania, the report described Mwalim Khalid as “an explosives expert and operational planner”. Mwalim Khalid had dispatched dozens of Al Hijra fighters from Somalia to carry out attacks in Kenya. Al Hijra had transformed from the Muslim Youth Centre (MYC), which recruited its followers from Majengo, Nairobi, and the port city of Mombasa. The group was formed by Ahmed Iman Ali, a preacher in Nairobi who had fled to Somalia in 2009. At the Coast, the group was led by Sheikh Aboud Rogo Mohammed.
Rogo was killed in a drive-by shooting in Mombasa in August 2012. Mwalim Khalid would also be killed a couple of months later.
On the plot against the President, Rashid reportedly camped in Nyeri where the Head of State had engagements. At times, President Kibaki would host delegations at Sagana State Lodge.
The group reported during a meeting on January 24, 2013 in Tanga that Rashid had claimed “the former Prime Minister had at times travelled in Nairobi without his security detail”.
On September 5, 2012, Makaburi was detained for allegedly inciting young Muslims, mainly from his Mtwapa madrassa and Masjid Musa, to violent demonstrations following the killing of his associate, Rogo.
The Monitoring Group also cited credible information suggesting that, following Rogo’s death, Makaburi contacted senior al-Shabaab leaders in Somalia for assistance in carrying out reprisal attacks in Kenya. Mwalim Khalid had in June 2012 dispatched a group of Somalia-based Al-Hijra fighters to Kenya as part of al-Shabaab’s operations to destabilise the country.
The plot against Parliament had emerged earlier in December 2011 during the interrogation by the Kenyan security services of the Al-Qaeda-affiliated Jermaine John Grant. Grant had claimed al-Shabaab was planning to attack a number of targets in Kenya, including Parliament buildings. Information about the plot on Parliament buildings was corroborated during a meeting in Tanga on January 23, 2013 in which Rashid alluded to being aware of it.
On October 28, 2012, while travelling from Nairobi to Mombasa, most probably to coordinate further attacks in Mombasa, Mwalim Khalid was intercepted at Mariakani, less than an hour from Mombasa.
Photographic evidence obtained by the Monitoring Group indicated that Mwalim Khalid was in possession of a small arms cache. Following his interception, Mwalim Khalid led security services to an associate, Omar Faraj, hiding in Mombasa. Reports at the time indicated both Mwalim Khalid and Omar Faraj were killed by the security services in a shootout.
Information received by the Monitoring Group suggests that, after the killing of Mwalim Khalid and his failed plot on Parliament buildings, Al Hijra was forced to rethink its operations, particularly in Mombasa.
During a discussion at a safe house in Mwanza, Tanzania, Al Hijra fighter, Athman Ahmed Mwarabu, acknowledged: “We had planned everything. We were ready even before that. When Titus (‘Mwalim Khalid’) was got (killed), it ruined our plans. But we didn’t lose our morale. We started planning afresh.”
Almost a month later in November 2012, Kenyan security services again disrupted a plot involving Al Hijra members, including Khubeib Rogo, who had recently returned from Somalia, and Swaleh Abdulmajid, who in 2010 was arrested for attempting to travel to Somalia to join Al-Shabaab with UK national Michael Olumide Adebolajo.
The Monitoring Group revealed it had indirect access to Khubeib Aboud Rogo while on remand in Shimo la Tewa prison in November 2012. Some of Khubeib Rogo’s audio information has been archived with the United Nations.
“This testimony, albeit obtained under interrogation, is corroborated by another Al Hijra fighter returning from Somalia who was arrested on September 6 2012, and who confirmed that ‘Mohammed Seif’ had been dispatched by Al-Shabaab as a suicide bomber,” the Monitoring Group reported citing interviews with a law enforcement official on November 24 2012.
A year later, Al Shabaab struck Nairobi with a brazen attack on the Westgate shopping mall.
Kenya submitted to the ICJ elaborate intelligence demonstrating how the attack was planned, as well as subsequent terrorist attacks, to support its case it has borne the brunt of terrorism fuelled by Somalia’s instability.
US amends terror designation of Shabaab to include Kenyan ‘wing’
July 19, 2018
FDD’s Long War Journal
The State Department announced today that the US government’s terror designation for Shabaab has been amended to include Al-Hijra, a “wing” of the group based in Kenya. Shabaab is al Qaeda’s branch in Somalia and East Africa, a fact that it continues to advertise even as it wages a prolific insurgency against Somali forces and their international allies.
Al-Hijra, which was established in 2008, is “extensively interconnected with” Shabaab “both organizationally and operationally,” according to State. It “consists primarily of Kenyan and Somali followers” of Shabaab and has “openly engaged” in “recruiting” for the group in Kenya, while also facilitating the “travel” of “Shabaab members to Somalia for terrorism purposes.”
Although the State Department doesn’t say it, Al-Hijra has also played a key role in Shabaab’s external operations — that is, plotting terrorist attacks outside of Somalia’s borders. And the group’s senior leaders have been hunted down as part of a US-backed counterterrorism program.
One of Shabaab’s worst terrorist attacks to date was carried out at the Westgate Mall in Kenya in Sept. 2013. Just two months before more than 70 people were massacred in that mall, a group of UN experts warned that Al-Hijra was helping Shabaab plan “new and more complex operations.” That warning was contained in a report published by the UN’s Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea on July 12, 2013.
Many of the details below, drawing on that UN report and other sources, were previously published by FDD’s Long War Journal shortly after the Westgate Mall attack.
As of 2013, according to the UN, Shabaab “expected to exploit its strong ties with extremist groups in Kenya and the United Republic of Tanzania to facilitate its external operations.” This conclusion was based on the “testimonies” of “serving and former” Al Hijra fighters, as well as “documents attributed to senior” Shabaab leaders.
However, Al-Hijra had “suffered significant setbacks” and this “impeded” Shabaab’s “threat capacity” in East Africa. Yet, the threat from both groups remained.
The UN reported that a key source of Al-Hijra’s problems was the “Al-Shabaab/East Africa Al-Qaida Disruption Initiative,” which is funded by the United States and assists “East African security services in combating terrorism.” The initiative targeted Al-Hijra and was responsible for “unexplained killings, disappearances, continuous ‘catch and release’ arrest raids and operational disruptions,” according to the UN.
The UN identified several Al-Hijra leaders who had been killed or disappeared as part of the initiative, including Sheikh Aboud Rogo Mohammed, Al-Hijra’s “ideological leader,” who was “inexplicably killed in Mombasa, Kenya” on Aug. 27, 2012. Rogo was designated a terrorist by the US government and the UN the previous month, on July 5, 2012. The Treasury Department said Rogo played a key role in recruiting Kenyans for Shabaab, among other nefarious activities.
Al-Hijra has not been shy about its allegiance to al Qaeda. In Feb. 2012, Al-Hijra (then known as the Muslim Youth Center) declared it was “part of al Qaeda East Africa,” just one day after al Qaeda and Shabaab formalized their longstanding relationship and announced their merger. [See FDD’s Long War Journal report, ‘We in MYC are now part of al Qaeda East Africa’.]
In response to the intense counterterrorism efforts focused on Al-Hijra, the UN’s report found that the group “sought operational direction and guidance since the latter part of 2012 from individuals with former ties to Al Qaeda in East Africa and self-styled Al Qaeda affiliates.”
The UN named two al Qaeda-affiliated individuals Al-Hijra had been consulting. One was Abubakar Shariff Ahmed (a.k.a “Makaburi”), who was designated a terrorist by both the UN and US in 2012. The UN noted at the time that Makaburi was especially close to Shabaab’s leadership and had preached “that young men should travel to Somalia, commit extremist acts, fight for al Qaeda, and kill US citizens.”
According to the UN’s 2013 report, Makaburi “exerted a growing influence over Al-Hijra” and was “determined to redirect the group’s resources and manpower from hitting ‘soft targets’ to conducting complex, large-scale attacks in Kenya on behalf and in support of” Shabaab.
Makaburi was subsequently killed in 2014.
The other al Qaeda-affiliated terrorist guiding Al-Hijra’s operations, according to the UN, was Jermaine John Grant. Even while imprisoned, Grant had “effectively provided assistance, albeit remotely, to ongoing plots involving both Al-Hijra” and Makaburi.
Grant, a British citizen, was arrested while allegedly planning a terrorist attack against tourists in Mombasa in 2011. According to The Telegraph and other sources, Samantha Lewthwaite, the widow of one of the July 7, 2005 London bombers, was reportedly involved in Grant’s plot as well. The British tabloids recently reported that intelligence officials suspect Lewthwaite (who has been dubbed the “White Widow”) has been recruiting suicide bombers for terrorist attacks against European tourist destinations around the Mediterranean. Of course, given the source of those reports, this should hardly be considered a lock.
According to the UN Monitoring Group’s 2013 report, Grant admitted to Kenyan authorities that he is a “member of al Qaeda and not” Shabaab, suggesting that he is part of Al Qaeda in East Africa’s operations. In reality, Shabaab is itself a part of al Qaeda.
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