In a revealing follow-up to the Auditor General’s report on Nairobi County Finances, a concerning narrative unfolds around the Nairobi Metropolitan Services (NMS), spotlighting a period (2020-2022) marred by egregious financial mismanagement and corruption. Kenyans deserve a transparent account of the events during this timeframe, especially concerning the NMS’s construction department procurement processes.
Navigating Uncharted Territories: NMS’s Procurement Puzzle
Upon its inception, NMS faced a unique challenge; it was a nascent entity without a roster of pre-qualified suppliers for its procurement needs. To navigate this hurdle, NMS leadership leaned on the Public Works Supplies Branch database, utilizing existing framework contracts to fulfill procurement requirements without initiating new tenders. Framework contracts, pre-negotiated agreements with fixed prices over two years, simplified procurement by allowing for direct issuance of Purchase Orders (POs) for goods, thereby sidestepping the need for fresh procurement processes.
Evidence Number One
Be keen on the Purchase Order Number. This is what will differentiate the Purchase Orders as everything else is identical.
The Purchase Order is valid, IFMIS GENERATED. Signed properly.
The Purchase Order Number in question are numbered
1. 20075
2. 20076
3. 20077
4. 20078
They all requested for
Coloured Cabros
2,880 in quantity
2,100 in price quoted
With total Price of the order being Ksh 6,048,000. But where is the fraud? You may ask!
The fraudsters will deliver only 2,880 pieces of Coloured Cabros. This 2,880 will be used to certify or mark the other three Purchase Order as completed. This is where Engineer Ochieng used to come in.
So in such scenario Kenyans lost
Ksh 6,048,000 * 3 = Ksh 18,144, 000
Also as you can see all the Purchase Orders are of the same date, November 4th, 2021.
Just a simple Question my brother
If you’re requesting for 11, 520 Coloured Cabros ( 2,880 * 4) from the same Company on the same day. Why not do a single Purchase Order?
Because if they did one Purchase Order supplying Oxygen or Hewa would be next to impossible, as that now would be under delivery of products demanded.
Also this game is very good for consumable goods. As consumables are used as they are delivered thus getting physical proof something was not delivered is hardest if the person to verify delivery is in the game.
The Central Figure: Engineer Michael Ochieng
A key figure in this saga is Engineer Michael Ochieng, then Director of Transport and Public Works. Intriguingly, Ochieng was pivotal at every stage of the procurement process; he was responsible for requisitioning materials for public works and also played the critical role of verifying these materials upon delivery. This dual role of requestor and verifier, essential for ensuring the integrity of the procurement process, was compromised, casting shadows on the transparency and accountability of the operations under his watch.
Evidence Number Two
Another case is this on 24 August, 2020
Same product requested, on the same day, in successive Purchase Orders.
See the Purchase Orders Number
15207 and 15208, both of which require 3/8 Ballast 2,500 Tonnes at Ksh 3,200 per tonne.
The total cost comes to around 8,000,000. But with a duplicate purchase order, Engineer Ochieng and his gang gets to loot the other Ksh 8,000,000.
The Allegations: A Web of Corruption
The operational dynamics at NMS’s storage facilities, particularly the main plant along Nanyuki Road in the Industrial Area, serve as the backdrop for the alleged corrupt practices. The Auditor General’s report hints at discrepancies, including missing delivered items at this facility. Here, Ochieng is accused of exploiting his position, demanding bribes from suppliers under the guise of verifying delivered goods.
The modus operandi allegedly involved the issuance of multiple identical Purchase Orders to a single company in rapid succession, with a twist: of the several orders dispatched, tangible delivery was made for only one. The remaining orders were reportedly marked as fulfilled using the initial delivery as a cover, essentially fabricating ghost deliveries for the undelivered orders.
This intricate scheme of issuing multiple Purchase Orders for the same product, quantity, and price, while only fulfilling one and falsely marking the others as delivered, unveils a concerning pattern of purportedly budgeted corruption within NMS. Such practices not only undermine the integrity of public procurement but also rob the citizens of Nairobi of valuable resources and services.
As the narrative around NMS’s procurement activities during 2020-2022 unfolds, it raises critical questions about governance, accountability, and the mechanisms in place to safeguard public resources against corruption. The revelations call for a rigorous review of procurement processes, stringent oversight, and, most importantly, a collective resolve to root out corruption for the betterment of Kenya’s future.
Evidence Number Three
This is on the same date and the same company and almost supplying the same product, but this time, it’s ballast.
The amount is just the same Ksh 3,200.
Purchase Orders Number 15393 and 15396
Product Ballast aggregate 1/2 and 3/8
Same selling price 3,200 shillings
Same Quantity required 5,000 tonnes
Same total price 16,000,000
As you can see, this you can detect was a mistake on the person who was doing the requisition ( product choosing) as the quantity and payment price are exactly the same.
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